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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium of a model where re-
peated voting on social security and the evolution of household characteristics in gen-
eral equilibrium are mutually aﬀected over time. In particular, we incorporate within-
cohort heterogeneity in a two-period Overlapping-Generation model to capture the intra-
generational redistributive eﬀect of social security transfers. Political decision-making is
represented by a probabilistic voting à la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). We analytically
characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium, in which social security tax rates are shown to
be increasing in wealth inequality. The dynamic interaction between inequality and social
security leads to growing social security programs. We also perform some normative analy-
sis, showing that the politico-economic equilibrium outcomes are fundamentally diﬀerent
from the Ramsey allocation.
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1 Introduction
Most developed countries have large public pension programs, involving not only inter-generational
but also intra-generational transfers. For instance, social security contributions are roughly
proportional to income while benefits have important lump-sum components. The general
equilibrium eﬀects and the welfare implications of such a social security have been extensively
studied in the literature.1 However, the welfare state is not exogenously imposed but endoge-
nously determined by policy choices that reflect rich dynamic interactions between political
and economic factors. For instance, the evolution of the distribution of household charac-
teristics in general equilibrium may alter the political support for the social security system,
since households with diﬀerent characteristics tend to have diﬀerent preferences over transfers.
Despite this, most of the existing literature has either assumed away politico-economic factors
or, when considering them, it has focused on models where the size of social security is decided
once-and-for-all. As a result, the feedback of endogenous changes of household characteristics
on the decision of social security transfers over time has been ignored altogether (e.g. Tabellini,
2000, Cooley and Soares, 1999, Conesa and Krueger, 1999).2
The present paper explores the positive implications and the welfare properties of a ra-
tional choice theory implying interactions between private intertemporal choices and repeated
political decisions on social security. To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium
model where agents repeatedly vote over the social security system. We also analyze normative
implications by comparing the political equilibrium with the Ramsey allocation chosen by a
benevolent planner with a commitment technology.
In our model, the incumbent government cannot commit to future transfers since they are
decided by future elected governments. Instead, transfers are determined in each period by the
current constituency, of which the extent of wealth inequality is a key factor. Forward-looking
households adjust their private savings when rationally anticipating the equilibrium dynamics
of wealth inequality and social security. A main finding is that this interaction leads to an
equilibrium where social security transfers increase over time. The underlying mechanism
is twofold. On the one hand, the establishment of a social security increases future wealth
inequality since within-cohort transfers discourage private savings of the poor more than those
1See, among many others, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) and Storesletten et al.
(1999).
2A notable exception is Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), where the interaction between private intertemporal
choices and political decisions may lead to a decreasing size of social security.
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of the rich. On the other hand, the larger wealth inequality makes transfers more desirable in
the future. This provides the political support for an increasing size of social security in the
following periods.
Our workhorse is a standard two-period Overlapping-Generation model. To capture the
intra-generational redistributive role of social security, we incorporate within-cohort hetero-
geneity by assuming young households to be born with diﬀerent labor productivities. Old
households are diﬀerent in terms of wealth. In other words, there exists multi-dimensional
heterogeneity across voters. Each group of voters has its own preferences over transfers. The
political decision process is modeled by a repeated probabilistic voting framework.3 In equilib-
rium, policymaker candidates respond to electoral uncertainty by proposing a policy platform
that maximizes a weighted-average welfare of all groups of voters.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, where the size of social security is conditioned on
payoﬀ-relevant fundamental elements: the distribution of assets held by old households. The
Markov perfect equilibrium is obtained as one takes the limit of a finite horizon environment.4
Moreover, under logarithm utility and Cobb-Douglas production technology, the equilibrium
can be characterized analytically, making the underlying politico-economic mechanism highly
transparent. In particular, we show that the equilibrium social security tax rate is increasing
in wealth inequality and this positive relationship generates growing social security over time.
The model calibrated to the U.S. economy predicts a long-run size of social security of 9.32%,
which is roughly in line with the data.5
The tractable model allows a comparison between the politico-economic equilibrium out-
comes and the Ramsey allocation, in which a benevolent planner with a commitment technol-
ogy maximizes the discounted sum of the welfare of all current and future generations. Under
logarithm utility and Cobb-Douglas production technology, the Ramsey solution can also be
characterized analytically. We find that the Ramsey solution features a decreasing size of so-
cial security if the social discount factor is not too small. This sharply contrasts increasing
transfers in the political equilibrium. The basic intuition is straightforward. The initial in-
elastic capital stock provides the incentive for the Ramsey planner to impose high taxes for
3The probabilistic voting framework is adapted from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). See Hassler et al. (2005)
and Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005) for applications of the repeated probabilistic voting in dynamic political
economy.
4Previous literature has studied the sustainability and evolution of social security by assuming that voters
play trigger strategies (e.g. Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000). Although trigger strategy may provide analytical
convenience and have reasonable components, it is hard to provide sharp empirical predictions due to the
indeterminacy of equilibria.
5The size is measured by social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. The average size of social security
from 1960 to 1997 is 9.53% in the U.S. Data source: Brady et al. (2004).
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redistributive reasons.6 However, since she can commit to future policies, low taxation will
be adopted for encouraging capital accumulation in periods other than the initial one. In our
calibrated economy, the Ramsey allocation gives a long-run size of social security of 3.16%,
much lower than the political equilibrium outcome.
It is worth emphasizing that in Markov equilibria, voters do not only hold rational ex-
pectations on future equilibrium outcomes, but may strategically aﬀect future policies via the
impact of current policies on private intertemporal choices. Under logarithm utility, the cur-
rent tax rate has symmetric eﬀects on private savings of the rich and poor. Thus, it cannot
aﬀect future states of the economy (wealth distribution), nor future policy outcomes. In other
words, strategic eﬀects are mute in the particular case of logarithm utility. Strategic eﬀects
appear when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is diﬀerent from unity. In these cases
analytical results cannot be obtained, but we can numerically study the qualitative and quanti-
tative impact of strategic eﬀects. To this end, it is useful to compare Markov perfect equilibria
with an environment (referred to as "myopic voting equilibria"), where voters can rationally
expect future policy outcomes but assume, incorrectly, that there are no strategic interaction
between the current and future policies.7 We show that if the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is smaller than unity, as suggested by many empirical studies, the strategic eﬀect is
positive. A higher tax rate today leads to a higher wealth inequality and hence larger transfers
tomorrow. Due to the positive strategic eﬀect, current voters have the incentive to strategi-
cally raise current social security taxes, in order to obtain larger transfers in the future. The
calibrated economy indicates that the strategic eﬀect in Markovian equilibria is quantitatively
not important: the relative increase in transfers due to the strategic eﬀect is less than 4%.
The sustainability of the social security system has been widely discussed in the literature.8
However, the dynamic patterns of social security are much less investigated. Some pioneer
studies abstracting repeated voting include Verbon (1987) and Boadway and Wildasin (1989).
More recently, Forni (2005) shows that in a repeated political decision process, self-fulfilled
expectations on the positive relationship between current and future social security transfers
can lead to a growing pension scheme. The present paper extends the literature by linking the
evolution of the system to some economic fundamentals, i.e., wealth distribution. Our model
suggests that, though the inter-generational redistributive eﬀect is key to sustain the system,
6Unlike the mechanism for high initial capital tax rates in Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), the government
here has no attempt to confiscate the initial capital stock due to the pay-as-you-go social security system.
7A similar notion of pseudo-equilibrium is used by Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
8See, for example, Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), Cooley and Soares (1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999),
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a, 1999b), Tabellini (2000), Razin et al. (2002), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt
(2005).
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the intra-generational redistributive eﬀect plays a central role in the evolution of social security
in general equilibrium. In particular, the growing sizes of social security can be generated by
the interaction between transfers and wealth inequality.
Our work is part of a growing literature on dynamic politico-economic equilibrium, where
current voting may change fundamentals in the future political environment and hence, aﬀect
future policy outcomes. Because of the complexity of dynamic interaction between individual
intertemporal choice and voting strategy, analytical results are usually implausible except in
some small open economies (e.g. Hassler et al., 2003, Azzimonti Renzo, 2005). An exception
is Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005). They show that a closed-form solution of social security
transfers can be obtained in a growth model with logarithm utility and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology. However, the equilibrium policy rule in their model is a constant, and
therefore silent on the dynamics of social security. The present paper generalizes Gonzalez-
Eiras and Niepelt’s work by incorporating within-cohort heterogeneity, with all results keeping
analytical. The generalization gives an equilibrium policy rule which is nontrivially depen-
dent of fundamental elements in the politico-economic environment and hence, provides much
richer implications on the dynamics of policies. This also contrasts the literature that resorts
to numerical characterizations for nontrivial equilibrium policy rules in general equilibrium
(e.g. Krusell et al., 1997, Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3, the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium is defined and solved under logarithm utility.
Section 4 characterizes the Ramsey allocation. In Section 5, we solve numerically the political
equilibrium and the Ramsey allocation under a more general CRRA utility form. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy inhabited by an infinite sequence of overlapping-generations. Each gen-
eration lives for two periods. Households work in the first period of their life and then retire.
Labor supply is inelastic and normalized to unity. Assume the gross population growth rate
N t/N t−1 to be a constant n, where N t denotes the population of the cohort born at time t.
Young households are endowed with high labor productivity γh with probability P and
with low productivity γl (γh > γl) with probability 1 − P . For simplicity, let P = 1/2.9
Households with type j = l (h) are referred to as poor (rich). Wage income is taxed at the
flat rate, τ t. The after-tax net earning for young households of type j is (1− τ t)wjt . Old
9P has no eﬀect on the main results below.
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households receive benefits bt from a social security system and young households may save to
finance their consumption after retirement. The corresponding intertemporal decision solves
max
kjt+1
u
³
cy,jt
´
+ βu
³
co,jt+1
´
, (1)
subject to
cy,jt = (1− τ t)w
j
t − k
j
t+1, (2)
co,jt+1 = Rt+1k
j
t+1 + bt+1, (3)
where ci,jt and k
j
t+1 denote the consumption and savings of households of type (i, j), i ∈ {y, o}
and j ∈ {l, h}, respectively. The discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1). Rt+1 is the gross interest rate at
time t+ 1. We assume that u (c) = log (c), an assumption which will be relaxed in Section 5.
Let Kt and Lt be the aggregate capital stock and eﬀective labor used in production at time
t. The clearance of factor markets requires Kt = N t−1
¡
klt + kht
¢
/2 and Lt = N t
¡
γl + γh
¢
/2.
Without loss of generality, the average productivity
¡
γl + γh
¢
/2 is normalized to unity so that
γh = 2 − γl and Lt = N t. Assume that production follows Cobb-Douglas technology with a
constant return to scale, AKαt L
1−α
t , where A denotes total factor productivity and α ∈ (0, 1) is
the output elasticity of capital. Factor markets are competitive. Factor prices thus correspond
to marginal products
Rt = Aα (kt/n)α−1 , (4)
wt = A (1− α) (kt/n)α , (5)
where kt ≡
¡
kht + klt
¢
/2 is the average wealth holdings of old households. The individual wage
rate is wjt = γ
jwt. The average wage rate equals wt.
The flat-rate wage income tax rate τ t is determined through a political process that will be
specified below. τ t is imposed on the working generation to finance social security payments.
In addition to the inter-generational redistribution which defines the pay-as-you-go system,
pensions entail intra-generational redistributive elements. In most systems, social security
contributions are proportional to income, while benefits have lump-sum or even regressive
components. According to the Old Age Insurance of the U.S. social security system, for
example, a 1% increase in lifetime earnings leads to a 0.90%, 0.32%, 0.15% and 0.00% increase
in pension benefits from low to high income groups.10 Following Conesa and Krueger (1999)
and many others, we assume, for analytical convenience, social security benefits to be evenly
10See, for example, Storesletten et al. (2004).
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distributed within old households. It is also assumed that the budget of the social security
system must be balanced in each period. This implies that at any time t, social security
payments btN t−1 equal social security contributions τ t
¡
wlt + wht
¢
N t/2:
bt = nτ twt. (6)
2.1 Households’ Saving Choice
Under logarithm utility, households’ saving choice can be analytically obtained by the Euler
equation, co,jt+1/c
y,j
t = βRt+1, which solves (1). Since households are atomistic, they take factor
prices, aggregate savings, the current social security tax rate and future social security benefits
as given. Plugging factor prices (4), (5) and the balanced budget rule (6) into (2) and (3), the
Euler equation solves a doublet of private saving functions
kht+1 = S
h (kt, τ t, τ t+1) ≡ ω (τ t+1)ψ (τ t+1)A (1− τ t) (kt/n)α , (7)
klt+1 = S
l (kt, τ t, τ t+1) ≡ ψ (τ t+1)A (1− τ t) (kt/n)α , (8)
where ψ (·) and ω (·) are defined as:
ω (τ t+1) ≡
θα (1 + β) + (θ − 1) (1− α) τ t+1/2
α (1 + β)− (θ − 1) (1− α) τ t+1/2
, (9)
ψ (τ t+1) ≡
γl (1− α)β (α (1 + β)− (θ − 1) (1− α) τ t+1/2)
(1 + β) (α (1 + β) + (1− α) τ t+1)
, (10)
where θ ≡ γh/γl denotes the ratio of labor productivity of the rich to that of the poor. It is
easy to show that Sj1 > 0, S
j
2 < 0 and S
j
3 < 0, where subscript i denotes the partial derivative
with respect to the ith argument of S. A high kt increases the wage rate and thus, private
savings. The eﬀect of a high τ t is the opposite. Social security benefits increase the income
after retirement and hence, discourage private savings.
Note that θ = wht /wlt and ω (τ t) = kht /klt measure young households’ income inequality and
old households’ wealth inequality (excluding social security benefits), respectively.11 Without
social security system (τ t = 0), wealth inequality ω (0) coincides with income equality θ. The
establishment of a social security system can aﬀect future wealth inequality kht+1/k
l
t+1 via τ t
and τ t+1. First, under logarithm utility, (7) and (8) imply that τ t has a symmetric impact on
kht+1 and k
l
t+1 and thus, does not aﬀect k
h
t+1/k
l
t+1. Second, since ω (τ t+1) increases in τ t+1,
a high future social security tax rate τ t+1 enlarges future wealth inequality. The intuition is
the following. The poor receive the same amount of social security benefits as the rich after
11To avoid confusion, wealth inequality is hereinafter referred to as inequality in terms of old households’
wealth, excluding social security benefits.
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retirement, while their earnings are smaller than those of the rich. Therefore, high social
security benefits discourage savings of the poor more than those of the rich. The results are
written in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Assume that u (c) = log (c).
(i) Future wealth inequality kht+1/k
l
t+1 is increasing in the future social security tax rate
τ t+1.
(ii) Given τ t+1, kht+1/k
l
t+1 does not depend on the current social security tax rate τ t and
the aggregate capital kt.
The second part of Lemma 1 states an important property that will be frequently used in the
following analysis: the choice of the current tax rate has no eﬀect on future wealth inequality.
This property is due to the assumption of logarithm utility, which implies the cancellation of a
substitution and an income eﬀect and thus makes private savings proportional to labor income.
As will be seen below, Lemma 1 substantially simplifies the analysis throughout the paper.
(7) and (8) lead to the law of motion of aggregate capital
kt+1 = S (kt, τ t, τ t+1) ≡ φ (τ t+1)A (1− τ t) (kt/n)α , (11)
where φ (·) is defined as
φ (τ t+1) ≡
αβ (1− α)
α (1 + β) + (1− α) τ t+1
. (12)
It immediately follows that S1 > 0, S2 < 0 and S3 < 0. These aggregate results come from
Sj1 > 0, S
j
2 < 0 and S
j
3 < 0 implied by private saving functions (7) and (8).
3 Political Equilibrium
The social security tax rate τ t is chosen by some repeated political process at the beginning of
each period. In the present paper, we assume that τ t is determined in a probabilistic voting
framework (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). There are two policy-maker candidates running
electoral competition. The winner obtains the majority of the votes of all current voters
with unobservable ideological preferences towards political candidates. Since candidates only
care about winning the election, they will, in equilibrium, respond to electoral uncertainty by
proposing a policy platform that maximizes a weighted-average welfare of all current voters.
The weights reflect the sensitivity of diﬀerent groups of voters to policy changes.12 In the
12See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a more detailed discussion of probabilistic voting.
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context of our model, the political decision process of τ t can be formalized as
max
τ t
X
j=h,l
Uo,jt + n
X
j=h,l
Uy,jt , (13)
where U i,jt denotes the welfare of the households of type (i, j), i ∈ {y, o} and j ∈ {l, h}, with
Uo,jt ≡ u
³
co,jt
´
and Uy,jt ≡ u
³
cy,jt
´
+ βu
³
co,jt+1
´
. For notational convenience, the weights on
diﬀerent groups’ utility are set equal.13
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, in which the state of the economy is summarized
by the distribution of assets held by old households, kht and klt. Hence, the Markovian policy
rule of τ t can be written as
τ t = z
³
kht , k
l
t
´
, (14)
where z : R × R → [0, 1] is assumed to be continuous and diﬀerentiable for technical con-
venience.14 In Markov equilibria, the current political decision may aﬀect the future asset
distribution and thus, the future social security tax rate. Forward-looking voters will adjust
their intertemporal choice accordingly. To see this, we substitute (14) for τ t+1 in (7) and (8)
and solve a recursive form of private saving functions, which can be written as
kjt+1 = Sˆ
j (kt, τ t) . (15)
The expression of Sˆj is not available, unless we know the explicit form of z. However, some
properties of Sˆj can be obtained. Diﬀerentiating (7) and (8) with respect to τ t gives
∙
Sˆh2
Sˆl2
¸
=
∙
Sh2
Sl2
¸
+
∙
Sh3z1 Sh3z2
Sl3z1 Sl3z2
¸ ∙
Sˆh2
Sˆl2
¸
,
which pins down the partial derivatives of saving functions Sˆj :
Sˆh2 =
Sh2 +z2
¡
Sl2S
h
3 − Sh2Sl3
¢
1−z1Sh3 −z2Sl3
, (16)
Sˆl2 =
Sl2 +z1
¡
Sh2S
l
3 − Sl2Sh3
¢
1−z1Sh3 −z2Sl3
. (17)
Note that Sˆj2 generally diﬀers from S
j
2. This means that the perception of the policy rule z
will change the eﬀect of τ t on private savings. Correspondingly, the law of motion of aggregate
capital becomes
kt+1 = Sˆ (kt, τ t) ≡
Sˆh (kt, τ t) + Sˆl (kt, τ t)
2
, (18)
13Deviation from equal weights does not aﬀect the main results below.
14Krusell and Smith (2003) provide an example that discontinuous policy rules may lead to indeterminacy of
Markov equilibrium.
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with Sˆ2 =
³
Sˆh2 (kt, τ t) + Sˆ
l
2 (kt, τ t)
´
/2.
Given any z, the political decision on τ t solves (13), subject to budget constraints (2) and
(3), factor prices (4) and (5), the balanced-budget rule (6), private saving functions (15), the
law of motion of aggregate capital (18), and the non-negative constraint of τ t.15 This yields
an actual policy rule τ t = z¯
¡
kht , klt
¢
, with z¯ : R × R → [0, 1]. z is said to be a Markovian
equilibrium policy rule, if and only if z¯ = z. The formal definition of a Markov perfect
equilibrium is given as follows.
Definition 1 A Markov perfect political equilibrium is a triplet of functions S˜h, S˜l and z,
where private saving functions S˜j : R×R→ R, j ∈ {h, l}, and the policy rule z : R×R→ [0, 1]
are such that:
(1) Given the policy rule z, S˜j
¡
kht , klt
¢
= Sˆj
³
kjt ,z
¡
kht , klt
¢´
, where Sˆj is the recursive
private saving function (15).
(2) Given z and Sˆj, z¯ solves (13), subject to (2) to (6), (15), (18) and the non-negative
constraint of τ t.
(3) z¯ = z.
To solve the equilibrium policy rule z, we need to know the impact of the social security tax
rate τ t on the welfare of various groups of voters. Diﬀerentiating the utility of old households
with respect to τ t yields
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
= u0
³
co,jt
´
nwt > 0. (19)
Needless to say, old households always benefit from social security transfers. Substituting for
co,jt and wt, (19) can be rewritten as
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
=
1− α
2α k
j
t/k
i
t
1+kjt/k
i
t
+ (1− α) τ t
, (20)
where i, j ∈ {h, l}, i 6= j. ∂Uo,jt /∂τ t depends on wealth distribution. This highlights the
role of social security as an intra-generational redistributive policy. Specifically, the smaller is
the old household share of total wealth, the more welfare gains can they get from transfers.
Although the rich gain less, the aggregate welfare eﬀect of τ t on old households, ∂Uot /∂τ t =P
j=h,l
³
∂Uo,jt /∂τ t
´
/2, increases in wealth inequality due to the concavity of utility.16
15The constraint that τ t ≤ 1 is never binding since otherwise it delivers zero consumption to young households.
16This can be formally derived by showing that (∂Uot /∂τ t) /∂

kht /klt

> 0 for kht /klt > 1.
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Diﬀerentiating the utility of young households with respect to τ t yields
∂Uy,jt
∂τ t
= −u0
³
cy,jt
´
γjwt+βu0
³
co,jt+1
´µ
kjt+1
∂Rt+1
∂kt+1
+ nτ t+1
∂wt+1
∂kt+1
¶
Sˆ2+βu0
³
co,jt+1
´
nwt+1
∂τ t+1
∂τ t
.
(21)
Note that the eﬀect of τ t via k
j
t+1 cancels out due to the Euler equation. The first term in (21)
reflects the direct cost of social security contributions. The second term captures the general
equilibrium eﬀect of τ t via its impact on capital accumulation Sˆ2. The general equilibrium
eﬀect is twofold. On the one hand, a high τ t reduces private savings at time t, and thus reduces
the tax base of social security at time t + 1. On the other hand, young households at time t
benefit from a higher interest rate Rt+1. As long as τ t+1 or wealth inequality is not very large,
the interest rate eﬀect dominates the first eﬀect.17 Hence, the general equilibrium eﬀect can
benefit young households.18 The third term is the "strategic eﬀect", which captures the fact
that voters can aﬀect the future tax rate τ t+1 by their current choice of τ t. The sign and size
of the strategic eﬀect are determined by ∂τ t+1/∂τ t, which follows
∂τ t+1
∂τ t
= z1
³
kht+1, k
l
t+1
´
Sˆh2 (kt, τ t) +z2
³
kht+1, k
l
t+1
´
Sˆl2 (kt, τ t) . (22)
If ∂τ t+1/∂τ t > 0 (< 0), young households know that a higher current social security tax rate
leads to more (less) social security benefits in the future. Thus, they may strategically increase
(reduce) τ t as compared to the case where the current political choice does not aﬀect future
policy outcomes.19
Then, the first-order condition of (13) can be written as
X
j=h,l
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
+ n
X
j=h,l
∂Uy,jt
∂τ t
+ λt = 0, (23)
where λt denotes the multiplier on the non-negative constraint of τ t, λt = 0 for τ t > 0 and
λt > 0 for τ t = 0. (23) implies a functional equation for z. Under logarithm utility, the fixed-
point can be analytically obtained as the limit of finite-horizon solutions. The corresponding
political equilibrium is thus unique within the class of equilibria that are limits of equilibria in
a finite-horizon economy.
Proposition 1 Assume u (c) = log (c). In the Markov perfect equilibrium,
17This can be seen by the fact that sgn

kjt+1∂Rt+1/∂kt+1 + nτ t+1∂wt+1/∂kt+1

=sgn

−kjt+1/kt+1 + τ t+1

.
18Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2004) show that the interest rate eﬀect plays an important role in sustaining
the social security system in an economy without within-cohort heterogeneity.
19 In Section 5, we will study "the myopic voting equilibrium", where voters can rationally expect future policy
outcomes but assume there to be no strategic interaction between the current and future policies.
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(i) The policy rule z
¡
kht , klt
¢
follows
z
³
kht , k
l
t
´
=
½
H
¡
kht /klt
¢
> 0
0
if υα < 1, or if υα ≥ 1 and kht /klt > Θ (υ)
otherwise
, (24)
where
H
³
kht /k
l
t
´
≡
−Φ (υ) +
s
Φ (υ)2 + 4∆ (υ)
µ
α− 4υα
2kht /k
l
t
(1+kht /klt)
2
¶
2∆ (υ)
(25)
with υ ≡ n (1 + αβ) / (1− α), ∆ (υ) ≡ (1− α) + υ (1− α)2, Φ (υ) ≡ −1 + 2α + 2υα (1− α)
and Θ (υ) ≡ 2υα− 1 + 2
p
υα (υα− 1).
(ii) Private saving functions follow
S˜h
³
kht , k
l
t
´
= ω (τˆ)ψ (τˆ)A
³
1−z
³
kht , k
l
t
´´³³
kht + k
l
t
´
/ (2n)
´α
, (26)
S˜l
³
kht , k
l
t
´
= ψ (τˆ)A
³
1−z
³
kht , k
l
t
´´³³
kht + k
l
t
´
/ (2n)
´α
, (27)
where τˆ is a constant solving
τˆ = max {0,H (ω (τˆ))} . (28)
Proof : See the appendix.
Four remarks about this proposition are in order. First, the political decision on the
social security tax rate solely depends on wealth inequality. Moreover, it is easily seen that τ t
increases in kht /klt. That is to say, the larger the wealth inequality, the more political support
the social security program receives. Social security as an inter-generational redistribution
policy has been widely studied in the literature. The within-cohort redistributive components of
such a system are often neglected, however. In the context of the present model, the aggregate
welfare eﬀect of τ t on old households is increasing in wealth inequality. This reveals the
underlying mechanism for the positive relationship between τ t and kht /klt. Although ∂U
o,j
t /∂τ t
is diﬀerent among old households, τ t delivers the same welfare eﬀect on young households with
diﬀerent labor productivity. In the appendix, we show that
∂Uy,jt
∂τ t
= −1 + βα
1− τ t
, (29)
i.e., social security has no intra-generational redistributive eﬀect on young households. This
is primarily due to the symmetric eﬀect of τ t on private savings k
j
t+1, as discussed in the
preceding section. In addition, due to the logarithmic specification, aggregate capital kt is
additively separable in the utility. Hence, τ t is independent of kt. Although these properties
does not carry over into the case with a more general utility form, numerical experiments in
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Section 5 shows that our main results are robust: wealth inequality plays an essential role in
the decision of τ t and τ t is increasing in kht /klt.
Second, the conditions in Proposition 1 characterize the politico-economic environment
where the social security system can be sustained in the Markov equilibrium. For υα < 1 to
hold, a small n or α is needed. A small n implies a large share of old in the population and hence,
a large number of agents benefiting from the pension system. A low α implies that the interest
rate Rt+1 is rather elastic to aggregate capital kt+1. This amplifies the general equilibrium
eﬀect and hence mitigates the negative welfare eﬀect of τ t on young households, which can
directly be seen from (29). So a small n and α reinforce the political constituency of the
system. When υα ≥ 1, the intra-generational redistribution becomes the key. There would be
no social security system in an economy without within-cohort heterogeneity. However, social
security can be sustained as long as there exists a suﬃciently high level of inequality within
cohorts. Therefore, when υα ≥ 1, the political support largely comes from intra-generational
redistribution.
Third, (26) and (27) imply that τ t does not aﬀect future wealth inequality in the Markov
equilibrium, exactly the same as in the competitive equilibrium. Since the social security
tax rate is determined by wealth inequality as shown in (24), this property implies that the
strategic eﬀect under logarithm utility is mute, i.e., ∂τ t+1/∂τ t = 0.20 That is to say, although
current voters can in principle influence future political outcomes by aﬀecting future wealth
inequality, they are actually unable to do this. The lack of any strategic eﬀect is due to the fact
that future wealth inequality is independent of the current social security tax rate, as stated
in Lemma 1. This independence breaks down the dynamic link between τ t and τ t+1 in the
Markov equilibrium. The strategic eﬀect arises under a more general utility case, where the
choice of τ t may aﬀect future wealth inequality and thus, future policy outcomes. However, as
will be seen in Section 5, the strategic eﬀect turns out to be quantitatively unimportant.
Finally, τˆ which satisfies (28) is the rational expectation of future tax rates. Given any
expectation of τˆ , agents make intertemporal choices so that the future wealth inequality will
be equal to ω (τˆ). For the expectation to be self-fulfilled, τˆ must equal that implied by the
policy rule, i.e., τˆ = H (ω (τˆ)) for positive τˆ . Due to the rather complicated expression of
H (ω (τˆ)), we are unable to characterize analytically the solution of (28). Extensive numerical
experiments show that the self-fulfilled expectation τˆ is unique. Note that the formation of
the rational expectation on future tax rates holds for any time other than the initial period.
20 (24) implies that z1

kht , klt

/z2

kht , klt

= −klt+1/kht+1. (26) and (27) give Sˆh2 (kt, τ t) /Sˆl2 (kt, τ t) =
kht+1/klt+1. Plugging these two results into (22) establishes that ∂τ t+1/∂τ t = 0.
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Hence, all future tax rates are a constant and independent of the initial wealth inequality and
transfers. It is worthy emphasizing that future tax rates do follow the equilibrium policy rule
z. The constant tax rates are due to the fact that wealth inequality becomes a constant ω (τˆ)
after the initial period.
Now we can characterize the dynamics of wealth inequality and social security. Suppose
that voting for social security is unanticipatedly launched at time 1. So (9) implies that the
initial wealth inequality kh1/k
l
1 equals income inequality θ, which gives τ1 by the policy rule
z. In periods after the initial one, wealth inequality and tax rates are equal to ω (τˆ) and τˆ ,
respectively, as shown above. Therefore, kht /klt and τ t converge to the steady state in two
periods. Moreover, since ω (τˆ) ≥ ω (0) = θ, the expected transfers increase future wealth
inequality. This leads to a growing size of social security.21 To conclude, we have
Proposition 2 Assume that u (c) = log (c). In the Markov perfect equilibrium,
(i) Wealth inequality and the social security tax rate converge to the steady state in two
periods.
(ii) Wealth inequality and the social security tax rate in any subsequent period are higher
than those in the initial one.
Note that the dynamics of social security is not decided by the government with a commit-
ment technology. Instead, the system is repeatedly determined by its current constituency, of
which wealth inequality is a key factor. Forward-looking households, rationally perceiving the
link between wealth inequality and social security, will adjust their private savings accordingly.
This alters the constituency for social security in the future. In particular, Proposition 2 shows
that this interaction leads to a growing size of social security in the dynamic politico-economic
equilibrium. The underlying mechanism is twofold. On the one hand, the establishment of a
social security system increases future wealth inequality since within-cohort transfers discour-
age private savings of the poor more than those of the rich. On the other hand, the larger
wealth inequality makes transfers more desirable in the future. This provides the political
support for an increasing size of social security in following periods.
3.1 A Quantitative Exercise
Although the two-period OG model is very stylized, we would like to see quantitatively the
size of social security in a calibrated economy, and then assess the importance of the dynamic
21Formally, the tax rate τ t at any time t > 1 is equal to H (ω (τˆ)), which is greater than the initial tax rate
τ1 = H (ω (0)).
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interaction between kht /klt and τ t. The parameter values are set as follows. α = 0.36, as widely
adopted in the literature of macroeconomics (e.g. Prescott, 1986). The ratio of income of the
rich to income of the poor, θ, is set to 3 by the U.S. data.22 Each period in the OG model
is assumed to contain 30 years. Then, the gross growth rate of the U.S. population between
1970 and 2000 gives n = 1.384 (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2005). The discount factor is
calibrated such that the capital output ratio equals 2.5, which gives β = 0.96530. A is chosen
such that the steady state k without social security is equal to unity. Finally, we measure the
size of social security by social security transfers as a percentage of GDP, which is equal to
(1− α) τ t.
Suppose that there is no social security at time 0 and voting for the welfare state is unan-
ticipatedly launched at time 1. Let k0 = 1, i.e., the economy is in the steady state before
the establishment of social security.23 Table 1 provides details on the dynamics of wealth
inequality, social security tax rates, and the consumption of diﬀerent groups of households.
Wealth inequality kht /klt increases by 33% (from 3 to 3.96) in the first period and remains at
that level afterwards.24 Policy rule z gives that τ1 = 11.96% and τ t = 14.57% for t > 1. The
implied size of social security is thus equal to 7.65% in the first period and 9.32% afterwards,
respectively. The numbers are roughly in line with the average size of social security of 9.53%
in the U.S. between 1960 and 1997.25
[Insert Table 1]
Given the simplicity of the model, our calibrated political economy performs reasonably
well in terms of matching the size of social security in the U.S. Moreover, the quantitative
exercise suggests that the impact of the endogenous change in kht /klt on τ t is sizable; the social
security tax rate increases by nearly 20% between time 1 and 2. The nontrivial dynamic
interaction between wealth inequality and social security can thus help explain growing sizes
of the welfare state in OECD countries.26
It is worthy emphasizing that though social security enlarges wealth inequality (excluding
social security transfers), it does narrow the within-cohort consumption inequality. Without
22We use quintile income shares in Deininger and Squire (1996). Specifically, we calculate the income share
of the rich (poor) by summing incomes shares of the top (bottom) two quintiles and half of income share of the
middle quintile. The income ratio is rather stable, ranged between 2.8 and 3.2 from 1948 to 1991.
23By Proposition 1, k0 has no eﬀect on kht /klt and τ t.
24This is close to the result in a recent quantitative study by Fuster et al. (2003), which shows that introducing
social security increases the Gini coeﬃcient of asset distribution by 27% (from 0.51 to 0.65).
25Note that social security transfers data also include benefits for sickness and family allowance (see Brady
et al., 2004). So the average size of pension benefits in the U.S. should be lower than 9.53%.
26See for example Breyer and Craig (1997) for the description of growing social security benefits in OECD
countries.
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social security system, consumption inequality is equal to income inequality, i.e., co,ht /c
o,l
t =
cy,ht /c
y,l
t = 3 ∀t ≤ 0. After the establishment of social security, there is a significant decline in
the inequality of consumption, with cy,rt /c
y,p
t = c
o,r
t /c
o,p
t = 2.80 for t > 1. This reflects the role
of social security as an intra-generational redistributive policy.
4 Ramsey Solution
We have characterized the Markov political equilibrium. It is instructive to compare the
outcomes with the Ramsey solution. To this end, we characterize the eﬃcient allocation,
where a benevolent planner with a commitment technology sets the sequence of tax rates
{τ t}∞t=1 so as to maximize the sum of the discounted utilities of all generations. The planner’s
constraint is that the chosen policy should be implementable as a competitive equilibrium.
The corresponding Ramsey problem is
max
{τ t}∞t=1
β
X
j=h,l
Uo,j1 +
∞X
t=1
ρt
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
Uy,jt
⎞
⎠ , (30)
subject to individuals’ budget constraints (2) and (3), factor prices (4) and (5), the balanced-
budget rule (6), private saving functions (7) and (8), the law of motion of aggregate capital
(11) and the non-negative constraint of τ t. ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the intergenerational discount factor.
Compared with the political decision problem (13), the Ramsey allocation problem (30) has two
distinctive features. First, the Ramsey planner cares about the welfare of all future generations,
and second, she has the ability to commit to future policies.27
For notational convenience, It,t+i ≡ ∂kt+i/∂τ t is denoted as the impact of τ t on the future
capital stock kt+i for i ≥ 1, as implied by the law of motion of capital (11):
It,t+i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
∂kt+i
∂kt+i−1
∂kt+i−1
∂kt+i−2
· · ·
³
∂kt+1
∂τt +
∂kt+1
∂kt
∂kt
∂τ t
´
< 0
∂ki
∂ki−1
∂ki−1
∂ki−2
· · · ∂k2∂τ1 < 0
for t > 1
for t = 1
. (31)
The second line of (31) is due to the fact that k1 is predetermined. τ t also aﬀects the capital
stock at time t, since τ t may influence private savings in the preceding period. Its impact,
denoted by It,t, is equal to
It,t =
½ ∂kt
∂τ t < 0
0
for t > 1
for t = 1
. (32)
27Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2004) shows that if there is no within-cohort heterogeneity, the Ramsey solution
coincides with the first best allocation, which makes the calculation much simpler. However, the equivalence
does not carry over into the present model. It is straightforward that a social planner would like to eliminate
within-cohort consumption inequality. This outcome cannot be implemented as a competitive equilibrium, since
it implies 100% tax rate and zero capital stock. Therefore, the social planner approach cannot be adopted here.
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I1,1 = 0 since k1 is predetermined. Note that τ t directly influences the welfare of agents
born at time t and t − 1 by aﬀecting their after-tax net earnings and social security benefits,
respectively. In addition, τ t indirectly influences the welfare of agents born at time t and
afterwards via its impact on capital accumulation It,t+i. τ t has no eﬀect on agents born before
time t− 1.
Following the same procedure as in the preceding section, let us look at the impact of the
social security tax rate τ t on the welfare of various groups of households. Due to the envelope
argument based on the Euler equation, the welfare eﬀect of τ t on agents born at time t − 1,
∂Uy,jt−1/∂τ t, parallels its eﬀect on old households at time t, ∂U
o,j
t /∂τ t. Specifically,
∂Uy,jt−1
∂τ t
= β
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
= β
µ
u0
³
co,jt
´
nwt + u0
³
co,jt
´µ
kjt
∂Rt
∂kt
+ nτ t
∂wt
∂kt
¶
It,t
¶
, (33)
where It,t follows (32). The first term on the RHS of (33) reflects the direct eﬀect of τ t, which
increases social security transfers and thus benefits old households at time t. The second term
captures the general equilibrium eﬀect of τ t through It,t. Compare (33) with (19), we see that
the general equilibrium eﬀect is absent in the political decision process, where voters take kt
as given. In the Ramsey problem, the planner has the ability to commit to future policies.
Thus, she must take into account the impact of τ t on kt, for t > 1. As shown in the preceding
section, the general equilibrium eﬀect is twofold. The negative It,t reduces kt and thus, the
social security tax base. But a low kt increases the interest rate. The interest rate eﬀect
dominates if τ t or wealth inequality is not too large. The positive overall general equilibrium
eﬀect implies that the marginal benefit of τ t to the current old households in the Ramsey
problem tends to be larger than its counterpart in the political decision process. An exception
is that for t = 1, the welfare eﬀect of τ1 on old households equals that in (19), since the capital
in the initial period is predetermined (I1,1 = 0). More specifically, we have
Lemma 2 Assume that u (c) = log (c). In the Ramsey problem, the welfare eﬀect of τ t on old
households at time t equals
β
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1+β)(φ(τ t)+τ tφ0(τ t))
αγj+τ tφ(τ t)
− β(1−α)φ
0(τ t)
φ(τ t)
> 0
β 1−α
2α
kj1/k
i
1
1+kj1/k
i
1
+(1−α)τ1
> 0
for t > 1
for t = 1
, (34)
where φ (·) is defined by (12).
The first line of (34) is derived in the appendix and the second line simply follows (20).
Note that for t > 1, the marginal welfare gain is decreasing in γj . The intra-generational
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redistributive components of social security imply that the higher labor income a household
has, the less can she benefit from the pension system.
The social security tax rate τ t also aﬀects the welfare of all generations born at time t and
afterwards. The welfare eﬀect of τ t on young households at time t+ i, for i ≥ 0, equals
∂Uy,jt+i
∂τ t
= −u0
³
cy,jt+i
´
γjwt+i + u0
³
cy,jt+i
´
γj
∂wt+i
∂kt+i
(1− τ t+i) It,t+i
+βu0
³
co,jt+i+1
´µ
kjt+i+1
∂Rt+i+1
∂kt+i+1
+ nτ t+i+1
∂wt+i+1
∂kt+i+1
¶
It,t+i+1. (35)
As in (21), the first term in (35) reflects the direct cost of social security taxes for young
households. The second and third terms are the general equilibrium eﬀects via It+i and It+i+1.
Note that for i ≥ 1, the welfare eﬀect ∂Uy,jt+i/∂τ t does not enter the political decision on
τ t, since the welfare of future generations is ignored in electoral competition. For i = 0, a
comparison between (35) and (21) reveals that ∂Uy,jt /∂τ t in the Ramsey problem diﬀers from
its counterpart in the political equilibrium in two respects. First, the planner takes into account
the negative impact of τ t on kt+i, which reduces the social security tax base at time t+ i. This
eﬀect is captured by the second term on the RHS of (35). In the political equilibrium, voters
at time t takes kt as given and hence, ignore this negative impact. Second, there is no strategic
eﬀect in the Ramsey problem, since the planner can commit to future policies. However, we
have shown that the strategic eﬀect is mute under logarithm utility. Therefore, the welfare
loss of τ t to the current young households in the Ramsey problem is greater than that in the
political equilibrium, due to the negative It,t+i. An exception is that for t = 1, since I1,1 = 0,
the welfare eﬀect of τ1 on the young is exactly the same as that in the political decision.
Lemma 3 Assume that u (c) = log (c). In the Ramsey problem, the welfare eﬀect of τ t on
young households at time t+ i, for i ≥ 0, is equal to
∂Uy,jt+i
∂τ t
=
(
− (1+βα)α
i
1−τ t +
(1+βα)αi+1φ0(τ t)
φ(τ t)
< 0
− (1+βα)α
i
1−τ t < 0
if t > 1
if t = 1
, (36)
where φ (·) is defined by (12).
The proof is given in the appendix. Three remarks are in order. First, ∂Uy,jt+i/∂τ t < 0 shows
that τ t incurs a net welfare loss to all generations born at time t and afterwards. Second, the
magnitude of the loss only depends on the current tax rate τ t, due to the additive separability
implied by logarithm utility. The irrelevance of future capital stocks and future tax rates
remarkably simplifies the characterization of the Ramsey allocation. Third, τ t has the same
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eﬀect on the welfare of the poor and the rich, due to the symmetric eﬀect of τ t on private
savings kjt+1, as discussed in Section 2.
Now, the first-order conditions of (30) with respect to τ t can be written as:
β
X
j=h,l
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
+
∞X
i=0
⎛
⎝ρi+1
X
j=h,l
∂Uy,jt+i
∂τ t
⎞
⎠+ λt = 0, (37)
where λt is the multiplier on the non-negative constraint of τ t. Let us first solve τ1. Plugging
(34) and (36) into (37), we have
Proposition 3 Assume that u (c) = log (c). In the Ramsey solution,
(i) The initial social security tax rate
τ1 =
½
H
¡
kh1/k
l
1
¢
> 0
0
if υα < 1, or if υα ≥ 1 and kh1/kl1 > Θ (υ)
otherwise
, (38)
where H (·) follows (25) with υ ≡ ρ (1 + αβ) / (β (1− ρα) (1− α)).
(ii) τR1 R τM1 if and only if ρ Q βn/ (1 + αβn), where τR1 and τM1 denote the initial social
security tax rate in the Ramsey solution and the Markov political equilibrium, respectively.
Proof is given in the appendix. The first part of Proposition 3 states that the initial tax
rate τ1 is determined by the initial wealth inequality kh1/k
l
1, which parallels Proposition 1 in the
political equilibrium. A high kh1/k
l
1 leads to a high τ1, due to the within-cohort redistributive
eﬀects of τ1. The second part of the proposition compares the initial tax rate in the Ramsey
solution with that in the political equilibrium. There are two eﬀects which drive the political
outcome τM1 to deviate from the eﬃcient allocation τ
R
1 . To see this, we rewrite the first-order
condition of τ1 (37) as
β
X
j=h,l
∂Uo,j1
∂τ1
+ βn
X
j=h,l
∂Uy,j1
∂τ1
+
∞X
i=1
⎛
⎝ρi+1
X
j=h,l
∂Uy,ji+1
∂τ1
⎞
⎠− (βn− ρ)
X
j=h,l
∂Uy,j1
∂τ1
+ λ1 = 0. (39)
The first two terms on the LHS of (39) capture the same trade-oﬀ in the political decision
process (see 23).28 The third term reflects the negative impact of τ1 on the welfare of households
born after the initial period via capital accumulation (see Lemma 3). This negative impact,
which makes τM1 higher than τ
R
1 , is ignored in the political decision process since non-altruistic
voters do not care about future generations. The fourth term on the LHS of (39) illustrates
the discrepancy between the weight on the current young in the political decision process and
28Note that for t = 1, ∂Uo,j1 /∂τ1 is the same in both of the Markov political equilibrium and the Ramsey
problem, so as ∂Uy,j1 /∂τ1 (see Lemma 2 and 3).
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that in the Ramsey problem. If βn > ρ, this eﬀect is opposite to the first eﬀect; the Ramsey
planner would like to impose a higher τ1 since the weight on the young is lower than that in
the political decision process.29 The second part of Proposition 3 shows that the second eﬀect
dominates the first eﬀect for suﬃciently small social discount factors, i.e., ρ < βn/ (1 + αβn).
Now we proceed to τ t for t > 1. Plugging (34) and (36) into (37), one can find that τ t is a
constant over time. In the appendix, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that u (c) = log (c). In the Ramsey solution,
(i) The social security tax rate converges to a unique steady state in two periods.
(ii) If ρ > β(1−α)1+αβ , wealth inequality and the social security tax rate in any subsequent period
are lower than those in the initial one.
(iii) Define
Ω ≡ (1− α)β (1 + θ)
2
2αθ
− 2ρ (1 + βα) (2 + β − α)
(1− αρ) (1 + β) +
2β (1− α)2
α (1 + β)
. (40)
If Ω > 0, the steady state tax rate τ¯ > 0. If Ω ≤ 0, τ¯ = 0.
The first part of the proposition parallels Proposition 2 in the political equilibrium, except
that the uniqueness of the steady state can be established analytically in the Ramsey solution.
The common feature is that the eﬀect of the initial wealth inequality on social security tax
rates only lasts one period. This should not be surprising. As shown in Lemma 1, future
wealth inequality solely depends on the future tax rate.
The second part of Proposition 4 gives a suﬃcient condition for decreasing sizes of social
security over time. The condition holds for a wide range of parameter values.30 This sharply
contrasts the prediction of the political equilibrium. The somewhat surprising result primarily
comes from the fact that low tax rates substantially encourage capital accumulation. More-
over, as discussed above, forward-looking households will adjust their intertemporal choices
according to future transfers. The expectation of lower social security benefits in the future
will lead to a lower level of wealth inequality, which considerably oﬀsets the within-cohort
redistributive eﬀects of social security.
The third part of the proposition gives the condition that the social security system can be
sustained or not in the Ramsey allocation. It is immediate that Ω increases in θ but decreases
in ρ. Intuitively, a high income inequality θ increases the within-cohort redistributive benefit
of transfers. A high ρ, on the contrary, increases the relative weight on the welfare of future
29Social security always causes welfare loss to the young in both the political equilibrium and the Ramsey
allocation.
30 In our calibrated economy with α = 0.36 and β = 0.96530, the condition implies that ρ > 0.94730.
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generations, and thus makes social security as an inter-generational redistributive policy less
desirable. Figure 1 plots the threshold condition of θ implied by (40) under α = 0.36 and
β = 0.96530. Ω > 0 is satisfied for the region above the line in the figure. It can directly be
seen that a high ρ requires a high θ to sustain social security in the Ramsey allocation.
[Insert Figure 1]
4.1 A Quantitative Exercise
Now we compare quantitatively the Ramsey allocation with the political equilibrium in the
same calibrated economy as in Section 3.1. We assume that ρ = βn, i.e., the planner weighs
generations by their sizes and discounts their welfare by households’ discount factor. Results
are presented in Table 2. The parameter values give ρ = 0.48 > βn1+αβn = 0.41. By the second
part of Proposition 3, we know that the initial Ramsey social security tax rate is lower than
that in the political equilibrium. Specifically, τR1 = 6.32% < τ
M
1 = 11.96%. The political
decision process ignores the welfare of future generations and thus leaves too larger transfers
to the old in the initial period.31.
[Insert Table 2]
In terms of the long-run tax rate, it is straightforward that ρ > β(1−α)1+αβ = 0.20. Thus, the
second part of Proposition 4 implies a decreasing size of social security in the Ramsey solution.
The long-run Ramsey tax rate is 4.94%, much lower than the political equilibrium tax rate of
14.57%. The move from the political equilibrium to the Ramsey solution increases the steady
state consumption of the young rich and poor by 23% and 17%, respectively. The decline in
the steady state consumption of the old rich and poor is relatively modest, amounting to 1%
and 5%, respectively.
To conclude, the political equilibrium on social security transfers is fundamentally diﬀerent
from the Ramsey allocation. The political decision process delivers too large transfers in the
long run. Moreover, social security is converging to the steady state along an increasing path
in the political equilibrium. In contrast, the Ramsey allocation implies a decreasing size of
social security. These results hold true under a wide range of parameter values.
5 The Strategic Eﬀect under CRRA Utility
So far, we have focused on logarithm utility, which substantially simplifies the analysis and
makes explicit solutions available. However, many empirical studies suggest the elasticity of
31Since ρ = βn, the fourth term in (39) goes away.
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intertemporal substitution to be less than unity. It is an open question to what extent our
results would be aﬀected by the deviation from logarithm utility. Particularly, the strategic
eﬀect ∂τ t+1/∂τ t in the Markovian political equilibrium may arise under a less restrictive utility
form. This section adopts a more general CRRA utility function, to see whether analytical
results in the preceding sections are robust with the presence of strategic eﬀect. Assume that
u (c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ (41)
where σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Households’ intertem-
poral choices, the political decision as well as the Ramsey problem on social security tax rates
are characterized in the appendix. Analytical solutions cannot be obtained for σ 6= 1 so we
resort to numerical methods.
The computational strategy for the Markov perfect equilibrium adopts a standard pro-
jection method with Chebyshev collocation (Judd, 1992). The basic idea of the projection
method is to approximate unknown functions by finite, weighted sum of simple basis func-
tion such as polynomial. This method is applied for time-consistent problems in some recent
research (Judd, 2003 and Ortigueira, 2004). As for the Ramsey solution, we transform the
infinite-horizon problem into a finite-horizon problem by the truncated method (e.g. Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi, 1993). The corresponding algorithms are provided in the appendix.
Let us first look at the Markovian political equilibrium. The equilibrium policy outcomes
under σ = 2 are plotted in Figure 2.32 It can directly be seen that τ t is increasing in wealth
inequality kht /klt. Diﬀerent from the logarithm case, now the aggregate capital can aﬀect social
security tax rates; τ t turns out to be decreasing in kt. The solid line in Figure 3 plots the
evolution of the social security tax rate in the Markovian political equilibrium.33 As in the log
case, sizes of social security converge to the steady state along an increasing path. The main
diﬀerence is that convergence is asymptotic, instead of in two periods under logarithm utility.
However, the quantitative implication on the speed of convergence is robust; over 92% of the
gap between τ1 and τ∞ will be closed in one period.
[Insert Figure 2]
[Insert Figure 3]
The strategic eﬀect (22) arises for σ 6= 1. To identify the strategic eﬀect, it is useful to
study the myopic voting equilibrium where voters at time t have rational expectation on future
32The other parameters are set to the values in Section 3.1.
33As in Section 3, we assume that k0 = 1 and voting for social security is unanticipatedly launched at time 1.
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tax rates but (incorrectly) disregard the strategic eﬀect of the current political decision τ t on
future taxes. The formal definition is given as follows.
Definition 2 A myopic voting political equilibrium is a doublet of private saving functions
Sj : R× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R, j ∈ {h, l}, and a sequence of social security tax rates {τ t}∞t=1 such
that
(1) Sj is solved by the Euler equation.
(2) {τ t}∞t=1 is solved by (13), subject to budget constraints (2), (3), private saving functions
Sj and the non-negative constraint of τ t.
Recall that in the log case, the strategic eﬀect is mute and thus the myopic equilibrium
and the Markov equilibrium give the same outcomes. The dotted line in Figure 3 plots social
security tax rates in the myopic voting equilibrium, which turn out to be slightly lower than
those in the Markov perfect equilibrium. The discrepancy has its roots in the strategic eﬀect.
Under logarithm utility, private savings of the poor and those of the rich decrease in τ t by
the same proportions. Thus, the current social security tax rate does not aﬀect future wealth
inequality. For σ > 1, τ t aﬀects asymmetrically the incentive for income-smoothing between
the rich and poor. The asymmetric eﬀects enlarge future wealth inequality kht+1/k
l
t+1 and thus
raise the future social security tax rate τ t+1 via the equilibrium policy rule z. This gives rise
to a positive strategic eﬀect of τ t on τ t+1. Hence, the current young households would like
to strategically vote for a higher τ t, since it incurs higher future social security benefits. The
strategic eﬀect is quantitatively not important, however. The relative increase in the social
security tax rate due to the strategic eﬀect is less than 4%.
Finally, we turn to the Ramsey solution. The dashed line in Figure 3 plots the Ramsey
tax rates over time. As in the logarithm case, the Ramsey tax rates converge to the steady
state along a decreasing path and the long-run Ramsey tax rate is substantially lower than
that in the Markov political equilibrium. The underlying mechanism is essentially the same:
taxing more the initial inelastic tax base and lowering taxes afterwards to encourage capital
accumulation.
6 Conclusion
Redistributive transfers in the pay-as-you-go social security system create conflicts of interest
among various groups of households. The evolution of household characteristics may change
the political support for the system over time. Despite extensive studies of the aggregate
and distributive eﬀects of social security, most of the existing literature is silent on how the
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public decision on social security responds to time-varying political supports in dynamic general
equilibrium. In this paper, we analytically characterize the Markov perfect political equilibrium
in which private intertemporal choices and the repeated political decision on social security are
mutually aﬀected over time. The main finding is that the dynamic interaction between social
security and wealth inequality leads to growing sizes of social security, which may shed light
on the increasing generosity of social security in OECD countries during the post-war period
(Breyer and Craig, 1997).
We compare the political equilibrium with the Ramsey allocation. It turns out that they
are fundamentally diﬀerent. In particular, social security is converging to the steady state
along an increasing path in the politico-economic equilibrium, while the Ramsey allocation
implies a decreasing size of social security in the calibrated economy. Moreover, the political
decision process induces too large social security transfers in the long run, since non-altruistic
voters ignore the negative eﬀect of taxation on the welfare of future generations via capital
accumulation.
Our analysis is subject to a number of caveats. For instance, the theory is completely silent
on the structure of social security. An interesting extension is to analyze the determination
of the size of social security and the degree of its redistributiveness simultaneously.34 For
analytical convenience, we impose a balanced budget on social security transfers. A natural
extension of the model would be to relax this assumption. In a related work, Song, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2007) analyze the determination of public debt in a small open economy without
social security. It will be interesting for future research to incorporate government borrowing
into the current setup, to see how public debt is interacted with social security.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To solve the equilibrium policy rule, we first investigate a finite-period version of the model.
It will be shown that the limit of finite-horizon equilibria turns out to be equivalent to the
infinite-horizon equilibrium. Suppose that the economy terminates at time T and that young
households born at time T only live one period.
First consider the terminal period T . Since young households do not have any intertemporal
trade-oﬀ and cy,jT simply equals the net earning (1− τT ) γjwT , the welfare eﬀect of τT on young
households at time T is equal to
∂Uy,jT
∂τT
= −γ
jwT
cy,jT
= − 1
1− τT
. (42)
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The welfare eﬀect of τT on old households follows (20). Plugging (42) and (20) into the
first-order condition and assuming interior solution,X
j=h,l
1− α
2α k
j
T /k
i
T
1+kjT /k
i
T
+ (1− α) τT
− 2n 1
1− τT
= 0. (43)
Note that the second order condition always holds. (43) gives a quadratic equation of τT
∆ (υT ) τ2T +Φ (υT ) τT +
4υTα2khT/k
l
T¡
1 + khT/k
l
T
¢2 − α = 0, (44)
where υT ≡ n/ (1− α).
Now we consider the non-negative constraint. First consider the case where Φ (υT ) ≥ 0.
Since ∆ (υT ) > 0, there is a unique positive τT if and only if³
khT/k
l
T
´2
+ (2− 4υTα)
³
khT/k
l
T
´
+ 1 > 0. (45)
For υTα < 1, the condition always holds. Otherwise, we need
khT/k
l
T > 2υTα− 1 + 2
p
υTα (υTα− 1) or kht /klt < 2υTα− 1− 2
p
υTα (υTα− 1). (46)
The first inequality in (46) is binding since 2υTα − 1 + 2
p
υTα (υTα− 1) > 1 for υTα ≥ 1.
The other inequality in (46) cannot be satisfied since 2υTα − 1 − 2
p
υTα (υTα− 1) < 1 for
υTα ≥ 1.
Second consider the case where Φ (υT ) < 0. For υTα < 1, (45) ensures a unique positive
τT . For υTα ≥ 1, there can be two positive roots if the LHS of (45) is non-positive. This
implies n < 1/ (2α)− 1 and contradicts the condition that n ≥ 1/α− 1, as given by υTα ≥ 1.
To conclude, for υTα < 1, the Markovian policy rule at time T follows
τT = zT
³
khT , k
l
T
´
=
−Φ (υT ) +
s
Φ (υT )2 + 4∆ (υT )
µ
α− 4υTα
2khT /k
l
T
(1+khT /k
l
T )
2
¶
2∆ (υT )
> 0. (47)
For υTα ≥ 1, zT
¡
khT , k
l
T
¢
follows (47) if khT/k
l
T satisfies the first inequality in (46) and is equal
to zero otherwise.
Next we consider period T − 1. The policy rule zT
¡
khT , k
l
T
¢
at time T implies zT1 /zT2 =
−klT/khT . Some algebra manipulations establish
∂khT
∂τT−1
= Sˆh2 (kT−1, τT−1) = −ω (τT )ψ (τT )A (kT−1/n)α , (48)
∂klT
∂τT−1
= Sˆl2 (kT−1, τT−1) = −ψ (τT )A (kT−1/n)α , (49)
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where ω (·) and ψ (·) are defined by (9) and (10), respectively. This gives Sˆj2 (kT−1, τT−1) =
Sj2 (kT−1, τT−1, τT ). Moreover, substituting (48) and (49) for Sˆ
j
2 in (22) leads to
∂τT
∂τT−1
= 0. (50)
The intuition is the following. According to Lemma 1, for any given τT , τT−1 does not aﬀect
the future wealth inequality khT/k
l
T . Therefore, given the policy rule F
T as a function of khT/k
l
T ,
τT−1 has no impact on future policy outcome τT . The dynamic link between τT−1 and τT
breaks down and the strategic eﬀect does not exist.
The absence of the strategic eﬀect makes the rest of the derivation fairly straightforward.
The welfare eﬀect of τT−1 on young households follows (21). Using (50) and the indirect utility
approach, which will be specified in the next subsection, we find that
∂Uy,jT−1
∂τT−1
= − 1 + βα
1− τT−1
. (51)
The welfare eﬀect of τT−1 on old households still follows (20). Plugging (42) and (20) into the
first-order condition and assuming interior solution, we haveX
j=h,l
1− α
2α
kjT−1/k
i
T−1
1+kjT−1/k
i
T−1
+ (1− α) τT−1
− 2n 1 + βα
1− τT−1
= 0, (52)
which gives a quadratic equation of τT−1
∆ (υT−1) τ2T−1 +Φ (υT−1) τT−1 +
4υT−1α2khT−1/k
l
T−1¡
1 + khT−1/k
l
T−1
¢2 − α = 0, (53)
where υT−1 ≡ n (1 + αβ) / (1− α). The conditions for corner solutions can easily be derived
following the above procedures.
To conclude, for υT−1α < 1, the Markovian policy rule at time T − 1 follows
τT−1 = zT−1
³
khT−1, k
l
T−1
´
=
−Φ (υT−1) +
s
Φ (υT−1)2 + 4∆ (υT−1)
µ
α− 4υT−1α
2khT−1/k
l
T−1
(1+khT−1/k
l
T−1)
2
¶
2∆ (υT−1)
> 0.
(54)
For υT−1α ≥ 1, τT−1 follows (54) if khT−1/klT−1 satisfies
khT−1/k
l
T−1 > 2υT−1α− 1 + 2
p
υT−1α (υT−1α− 1) (55)
and τT−1 is equal to zero otherwise.
It immediately follows that the only diﬀerence inzT−1 andzT lies in υT−1 = n (1 + αβ) / (1− α)
and υT = n/ (1− α). Young households born at time T − 1 live for two periods and thus
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∂Uy,jT−1/∂τT−1 in (51) diﬀers from ∂U
y,j
T /∂τT in (42). Moreover, it can easily be seen that the
political decision on τ t for t < T −1 is exactly the same as in time T −1. The equivalence boils
down to the independence of ∂Uy,jt /∂τ t on the future tax rate and the mute strategic eﬀect, as
shown in (51) and (50), respectively. These two features transform the dynamic problem into
a static one. Consequently, the key parameter υt is exactly the same as υT−1 for t < T − 1.
The finite-horizon equilibria thus converge to the infinite-horizon equilibrium in two periods.
Finally, we need to solve the private saving function S˜j . (24) implies thatz1
¡
kht , klt
¢
/z2
¡
kht , klt
¢
=
−klt+1/kht+1. (16) and (17) can thus be rewritten as
Sˆh2 = S
h
2
1 +z2
¡¡
Sl2/S
h
2
¢
Sh3 − Sl3
¢
1 +z2
¡
(Sl/Sh)Sh3 − Sl3
¢ , (56)
Sˆl2 = S
l
2
1 +z1
¡¡
Sh2 /S
l
2
¢
Sl3 − Sl2Sh3
¢
1 +z1
¡
(Sh/Sl)Sh3 − Sl3
¢ . (57)
Since Sl2/S
h
2 = S
l/Sh, (56) and (57) give Sˆj2 = S
j
2. The same argument establishes that
Sˆj1 = S
j
1, which implies that Sˆ
h and Sˆl follow (26) and (27), respectively, with a constant τˆ
to be determined. Since future wealth inequality equals ω (τˆ), the equilibrium policy rule (24)
implies that τˆ solves (28). Substituting z for τ t in Sˆj establishes S˜j . ¤
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We use the indirect utility approach to simplify the derivation of the welfare eﬀect of social
security tax rates. Using individuals’ budget constraints (2) and (3), factor prices (4) and
(5), the balanced-budget (6), private saving functions (7) and (8) and the law of motion of
aggregate capital (11), after some algebra, we can obtain the indirect utility of all generations
born at time t in terms of kt, τ t and τ t+1:
V jt (kt, τ t, τ t+1) = (1 + βα)α log kt + (1 + βα) log (1− τ t)
+ (1 + β) log
¡
αγj + τ t+1φ (τ t+1)
¢
− β (1− α) logφ (τ t+1) , (58)
where φ (·) is defined by (12). The indirect utility of old households at time 1 is
Uo,j1 = log
Ã
2α
kj1/k
i
1
1 + kj1/k
i
1
+ (1− α) τ1
!
+ α log k1. (59)
Diﬀerentiating (58), the welfare eﬀect of τ t on old households at time t equals
β
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
=
∂V jt−1
∂τ t
= (1 + β)
φ (τ t) + τ tφ0 (τ t)
αγj + τ tφ (τ t)
− β (1− α) φ
0 (τ t)
φ (τ t)
, (60)
for t > 1. Diﬀerentiating (59) with respect to τ1 yields the second line of (34). This proves
the lemma. ¤
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7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
By (11), we know ∂kt+i/∂kt+i−1 = αkt+i/kt+i−1, ∂kt+1/∂τ t = −kt+1/ (1− τ t) and ∂kt/∂τ t =
φ0 (τ t) kt/φ (τ t). Thus, It,t+i can be written as
It,t+i =
(
αi−1kt+i
³
− 11−τ t + α
φ0(τ t)
φ(τ t)
´
−αi−1 ki1−τ1
for t > 1
for t = 1
. (61)
According to the indirect utility function (58), the welfare eﬀect of τ t on young households at
time t, for t > 1, equals
∂Uy,jt
∂τ t
=
∂V jt
∂τ t
+
∂V jt
∂kt
∂kt
∂τ t
= (1 + βα)
µ
− 1
1− τ t
+ α
φ0 (τ t)
φ (τ t)
¶
. (62)
The welfare eﬀect of τ t on households born after time t is
∂Uy,jt+i
∂τ t
=
∂V jt+i
∂kt+i
It,t+i = (1 + βα)αi
µ
− 1
1− τ t
+ α
φ0 (τ t)
φ (τ t)
¶
(63)
for i = 1, 2, · · · . The second equality in (63) comes from the first line in (61). (62) and (63)
give the first line of (36). Finally, for t = 1, we have
∂Uy,j1
∂τ1
=
∂V j1
∂τ1
= −1 + βα
1− τ1
(64)
and
∂Uy,ji+1
∂τ1
=
∂V ji+1
∂ki+1
I1,i+1 = −αi
1 + βα
1− τ1
(65)
for i = 1, 2, · · · . The second equality in (65) comes from the second line in (61). (64) and (65)
give the second line of (36). ¤
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The first-order condition of (30) with respect to τ1 is
β
X
j=h,l
∂Uo,j1
∂τ1
+
∞X
i=0
ρi+1
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
∂Uy,ji+1
∂τ1
⎞
⎠ = 0, (66)
where ∂Uy,ji /∂τ1 follows from (64) and (65). This leads to
β
X
j=h,l
1− α
2α k
j
1/k
i
1
1+kj1/k
i
1
+ (1− α) τ1
− 2ρ1 + βα
1− ρα
1
1− τ1
= 0, (67)
which gives a quadratic equation of τ1. Since ∂2U
o,j
1 /∂τ
2
1 and ∂
2Uy,ji+1/∂τ
2
1 are negative by (59),
(64) and (65), the second order condition is always satisfied.
Comparing (67) with (52), it is immediate that the closed-form solution of τ1 follows (38)
with υ ≡ ρ (1 + αβ) / (β (1− ρα) (1− α)). A comparison of the two first-order conditions
shows that τR1 R τM1 if and only if ρ Q βn/ (1 + αβn). ¤
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The first-order conditions of (30) with respect to τ t for t > 1 are
β
X
j=h,l
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
+
∞X
i=0
ρi+1
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
∂Uy,jt+i
∂τ t
⎞
⎠ = 0. (68)
Substituting (60), (62) and (63) for ∂Uo.jt /∂τ t and ∂U
y,j
t+i/∂τ t, respectively, (68) leads to
X
j=h,l
Ã
(1 + β)
¡
φ (τ t) + τ tφ0 (τ t)
¢
αγj + τ tφ (τ t)
!
−2ρ1 + βα
1− ρα
1
1− τ t
+2
µ
ρ
(1 + βα)α
1− ρα − β (1− α)
¶
φ0 (τ t)
φ (τ t)
= 0.
(69)
(69) solves a constant τ t for t > 1. Hence, the Ramsey tax rates converge to the steady state
in two periods.
Note that the second order conditions are always satisfied. To see this, (60) shows that
∂2Uo,jt /∂τ
2
t < 0. Diﬀerentiating (62) and (63) with respect to τ t establishes
sgn
Ã
∂2Uy,jt+i
∂τ2t
!
= sgn
Ã
α (1− α)2
(α (1 + β) + (1− α) τ t)2
− 1
(1− τ t)2
!
.
Since τ t ∈ [0, 1], it can easily be found that ∂2Uy,jt+i/∂τ2t < 0 always holds. The second order
condition implies that the solution of (69) is unique.
Now turn to the second part of the proposition. Compare (69) and (67), we only need to
show that for any τ ,
X
j=h,l
Ã
(1 + β)
¡
φ (τ) + τφ0 (τ)
¢
αγj + τφ (τ)
!
+ 2χ
φ0 (τ)
φ (τ)
< β
X
j=h,l
1− α
αγj + (1− α) τ ,
where χ ≡ ρ (1+βα)α1−ρα −β (1− α).35 The condition that ρ >
β(1−α)
(1+αβ) implies that χ > 0. Therefore,
it is suﬃcient to have
X
j=h,l
Ã
(1 + β)
¡
φ (τ) + τφ0 (τ)
¢
αγj + τφ (τ)
!
≤ β
X
j=h,l
1− α
αγj + (1− α) τ .
Since τφ (τ) > (1− α) τ , we are left to prove that
(1 + β)
¡
φ (τ) + τφ0 (τ)
¢
≤ β (1− α) .
Some algebra establishes that the inequality always holds.
35We use the fact that kj1/k
i
1 = γj/γi and γj + γi = 2.
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Finally we prove the third part of the proposition. Denote L (τ t) the LHS of (69). After
some algebra manipulations, L (τ t) can be written as
L (τ t) =
X
j=h,l
Ã
(1− α)βα2 (1 + β)2
(α (1 + β) + (1− α) τ t) (γjα2 (1 + β) + α (1− α) (γj + β) τ t)
!
−2ρ1 + βα
1− ρα
1
1− τ t
− 2
µ
ρ
(1 + βα)α
1− ρα − β (1− α)
¶
1− α
α (1 + β) + (1− α) τ t
.
It immediately follows that limτ t→1 L (τ t) = −∞. Since L0 (τ t) < 0 by the second order
condition, there is a strictly positive τ t if and only if L (0) > 0. This establishes (40).
7.6 CRRA Utility
Given (41), households’ problem (1) becomes
max
kjt+1
³
cy,jt
´1−σ
− 1
1− σ + β
³
co,jt+1
´1−σ
− 1
1− σ , (70)
subject to (2) and (3). Households’ saving choice follows the Euler equation co,jt+1/c
y,j
t =
(βRt+1)1/σ. Using budget constraints (2) and (3), factor prices (4) and (5) and the balanced-
budget rule (6), kjt+1 follows
kjt+1 = G
j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1) (71)
≡
γj
³
Aα (kt+1/n)α−1 β
´1/σ
A (1− α) (1− τ t) (kt/n)α −A (1− α) τ t+1kαt+1n1−α³
Aα (kt+1/n)α−1 β
´1/σ
+Aα (kt+1/n)α−1
.
By kt+1 =
P
j=h,l k
j
t+1/2, (71) solves private saving functions
kjt+1 = S
j (kt, τ t, τ t+1) , (72)
with
Sji =
Gji +
¡
GliG
h
4 −GhiGl4
¢
/2
1−
P
j=h,lG
j
4/2
, (73)
for i = 1, 2, 3. Correspondingly, the aggregate saving function can be written as
kt+1 = S (kt, τ t, τ t+1) , (74)
with
Si =
P
j=h,l S
j
i
2
. (75)
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Given the Markovian policy rule (14), a recursive form of private and aggregate saving
functions can be solved.
kjt+1 = Sˆ
j (kt, τ t) , (76)
kt+1 = Sˆ (kt, τ t) , (77)
with Sˆhi , Sˆ
l
i and Sˆi pinned down by the same method in Section 3, for i = 1, 2. These derivatives
will be used in the numerical solution, as will be seen in the next subsection. The welfare eﬀect,
∂Uo,jt /∂τ t and ∂U
y,j
t /∂τ t, as well as the first-order conditions of (13) still follow (19), (21) and
(23), respectively.
Now, we turn to the Ramsey problem. The indirect utility of young households at time t
can be expressed as follows.
W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1) ≡
¡
γjA (1− τ t) (kt/n)α + τ t+1kt+1/α
¢1−σ µ
1 + β1/σ
³
Aα (kt+1/n)α−1
´1/σ−1¶σ
.
(78)
(72) and (78) give the indirect utility function V jt (kt, τ t, τ t+1), with
∂V jt
∂kt
=
∂W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1)
∂kt
+
∂W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt
,
∂V jt
∂τ t
=
∂W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1)
∂τ t
+
∂W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂τ t
,
∂V jt
∂τ t+1
=
∂W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1)
∂τ t+1
+
∂W j (kt, τ t, τ t+1, kt+1)
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂τ t+1
.
The welfare eﬀects can be written as follows.
β
∂Uo,jt
∂τ t
=
∂V jt−1
∂τ t
, (79)
and
∂Uy,jt+i
∂τ t
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
∂V jt+i
∂kt+i
It,t+i
∂V jt
∂τ t +
∂V jt
∂kt It,t
if i ≥ 1
if i = 0
. (80)
The first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem still follow (37).
7.7 Numerical Method for the Markovian Political Equilibrium
A direct application of the projection method for the present problem with heterogeneous
agents is to approximate z, Sˆh and Sˆl by three two-dimensional n-order Chebyshev poly-
nomials with tensor products. Consequently, we need to pin down 3 × n2 coeﬃcients of the
polynomials that satisfy the Euler equation and the first-order condition (23). That is to say,
the computation will be involved in solving 3× n2 nonlinear equations.
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However, the analysis in the preceding subsection suggests that computing functions Sˆj is
not necessary. In fact, only the derivatives Sˆji , rather than the function Sˆ
j , are of importance for
the equilibrium policy rule z. The following strategy substantially reduces the computational
cost: the number of nonlinear equations drops from 3× n2 to n2. First, we approximate z by
z
³
kh, kl
´
=
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
aijφij
³
kh, kl
´
, (81)
where φij
¡
kh, kl
¢
are the tensor products of one-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials. The
second step is to pin down the partial derivatives appearing in the first-order condition (23).
Sji is easy to compute. Plugging z1, z2 and S
j
i into (??) and (??), Sˆ
j
i can be solved. Fi-
nally, choose n points in the state space
£
kh,min, kh,max
¤
and
£
kl,min, kl,max
¤
, respectively, by
Chebyshev collocation. The first-order condition (23) has to be satisfied for each point. Thus,
the functional equation is transformed into n2 nonlinear equations, which solve n2 unknown
coeﬃcients aij in (81).
Following Judd (1992), the accuracy of the approximation can be indirectly assessed by the
Euler equation error. Let z˜ be the approximated z. The Euler equation error on any given
pair
¡
kh, kl
¢
is measured by the percentage deviation from τ t implied by the approximated
equilibrium policy rule z
¡
kh, kl
¢
to the “true” optimal τ t that solves (23) as if z = z˜. The
accuracy increases with the order of Chebyshev polynomial. However, the improvement tends
to be less significant with higher degrees, which increase the computation cost exponentially.
In our case, the polynomial of 8-order turns out to be suﬃcient. The Euler equation errors
over 900 points that are uniformly collected in the state space are computed. The maximum
errors in all numerical experiments are below 10−3.
A common problem associated with the projection method is that the convergence of the
solution for unknown coeﬃcients highly depends on the initial guess. In a standard growth
model, a good initial guess can be obtained by linearizing the policy function around the steady
state. This problem turns out to be much more serious in the present environment since we
essentially have no idea about the steady state. Fortunately, we know the closed-form solution
z under logarithm utility. So we adopt a simple continuation method, i.e., using the analytical
solution z as an initial guess for σ = 1 + ε. Some perturbations on the initial guess are used
to check the local convergence of the solution. The equilibrium policy rule z turns out to be
unique in the numerical experiments so far.
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7.8 Numerical Method for the Ramsey Solution
Given the indirect utility V jt , the Ramsey problem (30) can be rewritten as
max
{τ t,kt+1}∞t=1
β
X
j=h,l
Uo,j1
³
kj1, k1, τ1
´
+
∞X
t=1
ρt
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
V jt (kt, τ t, τ t+1)
⎞
⎠ , (82)
subject to the law of motion of aggregate capital (74). The first-order conditions with respect
to τ t and kt for t > 1 areX
j=h,l
∂V jt−1
∂τ t
+ ρ
X
j=h,l
∂V jt
∂τ t
= μt−1
∂kt
∂τ t
+ ρμt
∂kt+1
∂τ t
, (83)
ρ
X
j=h,l
∂V jt
∂kt
= −μt−1 + ρμt
∂kt+1
∂kt
, (84)
where μt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Let x¯ be the steady state value of variable x. Denote
V¯ j1 , V¯
j
2 and V¯
j
3 as the steady states of ∂V
j
t /∂kt, ∂V
j
t /∂τ t and ∂V
j
t /∂τ t+1, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, S¯1, S¯2 and S¯3 are referred to as the steady states of ∂St/∂kt, ∂St/∂τ t and ∂St/∂τ t+1,
respectively. Then (84) leads to
μ¯ = −
ρ
P
j=h,l V¯
j
1
1− ρS¯1
. (85)
Using (85), (83) impliesX
j=h,l
V¯ j3 + ρ
X
j=h,l
V¯ j2 +
ρ
¡
ρS¯2 + S¯3
¢
1− ρS¯1
X
j=h,l
V¯ j1 = 0. (86)
Moreover, (74) gives
k¯ = S
¡
k¯, τ¯ , τ¯
¢
. (87)
(86) and (87) thus solve the steady state capital stock k¯ and the steady state social security
tax rate τ¯ .
Following Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), we adopt the truncated method to solve the
dynamics of the Ramsey allocation. Assume that the economy reaches the steady state after
period T . Then the infinite-horizon problem (82) can be approximated by a finite-horizon one
max
{τ t,kt+1}T−1t=1
β
X
j=h,l
Uo,j1
³
kj1, k1, τ1
´
+
T−1X
t=1
ρt
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
V jt (kt, τ t, τ t+1)
⎞
⎠+ Γ (kT , τ¯ , τ¯) , (88)
subject to the law of motion of aggregate capital (74). The value of continuation Γ (kT , τ¯ , τ¯) is
equal to
Γ (kT , τ¯ , τ¯) =
∞X
t=T
ρt
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
V jt (kT , τ¯ , τ¯)
⎞
⎠ , (89)
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which corrects the error caused by "end eﬀects". Therefore, standard nonlinear programming
techniques can be applied to solve (88). For interior solutions, {τ t}T−1t=1 may be directly solved
by the first-order conditions. Specifically, the eﬀect of τ t on Γ (kT , τ¯ , τ¯) is
∂Γ (kT , τ¯ , τ¯)
∂τ t
=
∞X
i=T−t
ρt+i
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
∂V jt+i
∂kt+i
It,t+i
⎞
⎠ =
ρT
P
j=h,l V¯
j
1
1− ρS¯1
It,T . (90)
Using (80) and (90), the first-order conditions of (82) with respect to τ t for t > 1 can be
written as
ρt−1
X
j=h,l
∂V jt−1
∂τ t
+ ρt
X
j=h,l
∂V jt
∂τ t
+
T−t−1X
i=0
ρt+i
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
∂V jt+i
∂kt+i
It,t+i
⎞
⎠+
ρT
P
j=h,l V¯
j
1
1− ρS¯1
It,T = 0. (91)
Similarly, we have the first-order condition of (82) with respect to τ1
β
X
j=h,l
∂Uo,j1
∂τ1
+ ρ
X
j=h,l
∂V j1
∂τ1
+
T−2X
i=0
ρi+1
⎛
⎝X
j=h,l
∂V j1+i
∂k1+i
I1,1+i
⎞
⎠+
ρT
P
j=h,l V¯
j
1
1− ρS¯1
I1,T = 0. (92)
(91) and (92) constitute a nonlinear equation system which solves {τ t}T−1t=1 .
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Table 1: Politico-Economic Equilibrium under Logarithm Utility 
 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=∞ 
kh/kl 3.0000 3.0000 3.9558 3.9558 
τ 0.0000 0.1196 0.1457 0.1457 
co,h 4.5683 5.2157 5.0656 4.6834 
co,l 1.5227 2.1703 1.8091 1.6726 
cy,h 4.3679 3.9878 3.4686 3.2069 
cy,l 1.4560 1.4242 1.2387 1.1453 
 
 
Table 2: Ramsey Solution under Logarithm Utility 
 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=∞ 
kh/kl 3.0000 
(3.0000) 
3.0000 
(3.0000) 
3.2800 
(3.9558) 
3.2800 
(3.9558) 
τ 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.4193 
(0.1196) 
0.0494 
(0.1457) 
0.0494 
(0.1457) 
co,h 4.5683 
(4.5683) 
6.8384 
(5.2157) 
3.9667 
(5.0656) 
4.6285 
(4.6834) 
co,l 1.5227 
(1.5227) 
3.7930 
(2.1703) 
1.3589 
(1.8091) 
1.5856 
(1.6726) 
cy,h 4.3679 
(4.3679) 
2.5655 
(3.9878) 
3.3741 
(3.4686) 
3.9361 
(3.2069) 
cy,l 1.4560 
(1.4560) 
0.8746 
(1.4242) 
1.1494 
(1.2387) 
1.3403 
(1.1453) 
Note: The politico-economic equilibrium outcomes are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: The other parameter values are set equal to the values in Section 3.1.
 Figure 2: The Markovian Equilibrium Policy Rule under σ=2 
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Figure 2: σ=2 and the other parameter values are set equal to the values in Section 3.1. 
 Figure 3: The Dynamics of Social Security under σ=2 
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Figure 3: σ=2, ρ=βn and the other parameter values are set equal to the values in 
Section 3.1. The solid, dotted and dashed lines refer to social security tax rates in the 
Markov political equilibrium, myopic voting equilibrium and Ramsey allocation, 
respectively. 
